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Abstract
Animal groups in nature often display an enhanced collective information-processing capacity. It has been speculated
that natural selection will tune this response to be optimal, ensuring the group is reactive while also being robust to
noise. Here we show that this is unlikely to be the case. By using a simple model of decision making in a dynamic
environment, we find that when individuals behave rationally, and are subject to selection based on their accuracy,
optimality of collective decision-making is not attained. Instead individuals overly rely on social information and
evolve to be too readily influenced by their neighbours. This is due to a classic evolutionary conflict between indi-
vidual and collective interest. The result is a sub-optimal system that is poised on the cusp of total unresponsiveness.
Individuals in the evolved group exhibit delayed reactions to changes in the environment, before responding with
rapid, socially-reinforced transitions, reminiscent of familiar human and animal social systems (markets, stampedes,
fashions, etc). Our results demonstrate that behaviour of this type may not be pathological, but instead could represent
an evolutionary attractor for such collective systems.
Social influence is a powerful force in nature and society. In many contexts, individuals gain an advantage by
observing and then copying the actions of others [1–3]. The result of this behaviour can be beneficial for all group
members; studies of collective behaviour in humans and animals have shown that the use of social information can
dampen individual errors and lead to greater decision accuracy [4–7], and may also result in an emergent collective
intelligence [8, 9]. While there are benefits to social information use, there can also be downsides [10–13]. Although
interaction can lead to enhanced information processing [14] and the spreading of novel technologies [15], it may also
lead to a lack of responsiveness to changing environments [16] and an over-reliance on the behaviour of others. When
individuals devalue their own personal information in favour of imitating the actions, or opinions, of others this is
termed an information cascade [10]. For example, a lack of individual autonomy has been blamed for disasters such
as the Challenger shuttle accident [17] and the 2008 financial collapse [18], while in a more commonplace setting,
Faria et al. [19] showed that the use of social information led to increased risk taking in road crossing pedestrians.
In the natural world, experiments have shown animals are also susceptible to information cascades [20, 21], causing
individuals to undervalue their personal information [22]. Further, simulations suggest that social behaviour may lead
to hysteresis, which means that collective movements, such as migration, are hard to recover once they are lost [23].
Given the substantial costs and benefits associated with the use of social information, an important question is
whether natural selection will tune individual behaviour to optimize information processing at the collective level.
To investigate this question, we employ an individual-based model of information use in the presence of an external,
dynamic information source. We assume that the fitness of individuals is determined by the accuracy of their response
to this environmental cue.
This deliberately abstract model could represent animals selecting a heading based on environmental cues as
in [23], or humans responding to an alarm signal as in [24]. Historically models of this type have been termed ‘binary
choice with externalities’ [25], and have been applied to socially influenced decisions to wear safety equipment in
sports [25], or to adopt a particular currency [26]. For animal groups this form of model may be applied to decisions,
for example, relating to movement in response to predators, or larger scale movements associated with migrations. In
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the latter case there is substantial evidence to suggest that both the decision of whether to migrate or not [27], and the
accuracy of migration [28, 29] are affected by social interaction.
Individuals are able to detect the external (global) information source, which we denote G(t), however detection
is not perfect, thus the actions of others may be used as an additional source of information. Individuals respond to
the environment with a binary response variable Ui ∈ {−1, 1} and we define individual i to be correct if
Ui(t) = sign [G(t)] . (1)
Decisions are made based on a personal estimate gi(t) and the observed opinions of individuals in a local neighbour-
hood, Ni. To model the imperfect environmental detection, the evolution of the personal estimate, gi(t), follows an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process of the form,
dgi(t) = −ωg [gi(t) −G(t)] dt + σdW(t) (2)
so that individuals make an estimate of the true signal and the quality of this estimate is improved by increasing ωg
and deteriorates as the level of noise, σ, increases. We note that this reduces all environmental information to a single
dimension and individuals have no scope for specialization. Functional diversity within groups, as in [30], is therefore
precluded.
Social information is contained in a binary vector of the states of individuals within the interaction neighbourhood,
U j∈Ni . It should be noted that this vector consists of the observed responses of neighbours, who themselves may be
using social information. This is in contrast to the classic ‘wisdom of crowds’ model in which independent individual
estimates are aggregated [31, 32].
By employing optimal decision theory [33, 34] we next determine the appropriate response of individual i to the
total information received,
{
gi(t),U j∈Ni
}
, subject to a single evolvable parameter ωs, which may be interpreted as the
level of confidence an individual has that its neighbours are correct.
1. Optimal individual decision-making
Following the approach of [33–35], we determine a weighting of social and personal information by noting that,
for each individual i, an optimal strategy is one for which,
Ui(t) =

+1, if P
(
G(t) ≥ 0∣∣∣gi(t),U j∈Ni)
> P
(
G(t) < 0
∣∣∣gi(t),U j∈Ni)
−1, if P
(
G(t) ≥ 0∣∣∣gi(t),U j∈Ni)
< P
(
G(t) < 0
∣∣∣gi(t),U j∈Ni)
(3)
In words this means that individual i should set Ui = +1 if, given all available information, the probability the true
state of the environment is greater than zero is greater than the probability that it is less. (Since the state G(t) = 0 has
Lebesgue measure zero we arbitrarily assign the optimal response to this state as Ui = 1.)
By applying Bayes’ theorem (and for clarity omitting the explicit time dependence) we find,
P
(
G ≥ 0∣∣∣ gi,U j∈Ni) = . . .
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G ≥ 0, gi) P (G ≥ 0∣∣∣gi) P (gi)
P
(
gi,U j∈Ni
) . (4)
Therefore, by employing Eqn. 4 and the equivalent expression for P
(
G < 0
∣∣∣gi,U j∈Ni), Eqn. 3 may be rearranged so
that the state G ≥ 0 is the most probable state ifP
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G ≥ 0, gi)
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G < 0, gi)

P
(
G ≥ 0∣∣∣gi)
P
(
G < 0
∣∣∣gi)
 > 1. (5)
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This expression is essentially a rewriting of Eqn. 3, with the role of social and personal information appearing sepa-
rately. The likelihood that the environment is in the state G ≥ 0, given the personal information gi may be calculated
from the properties of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, since
P
(
gi
∣∣∣G = z) = √ ωg
piσ2
e−ωg(gi−z)
2/σ2 . (6)
This represents the stationary solution of the process, hence is valid when G(t) varies slowly with respect to the
response time defined by ωg. (While this assumption does not hold when the environment is rapidly alternating,
simulations shown in Supplementary Fig. S3 demonstrate qualitatively equivalent results.) Again, employing Bayes’
theorem, we attain,
P
(
G = z
∣∣∣gi) = P
(
gi
∣∣∣G = z) P(G = z)
P(gi)
. (7)
As G ∈ [−1, 1], we have
P
(
G ≥ 0∣∣∣gi) = ∫ 1
0
P
(
gi
∣∣∣G = z) P(G = z)
P(gi)
dz (8)
and similarly,
P
(
G < 0
∣∣∣gi) = ∫ 0
−1
P
(
gi
∣∣∣G = z) P(G = z)
P(gi)
dz. (9)
Combining Eqns.6, 8 and 9, and cancelling constants leaves
P
(
G ≥ 0∣∣∣gi)
P
(
G < 0
∣∣∣gi) =
∫ 1
0 e
−ωg(gi−z)2/σ2P(G = z)dz∫ 0
−1 e
−ωg(gi−z)2/σ2P(G = z)dz
(10)
We next consider the problem of weighting the social information. Since the accuracy of neighbours depends on
their own strategies, the question of how to weight this information is analytically intractable. However, we are able
to reduce the problem to a single parameter, denoted ωs, that represents the assumed probability an individual has
that a randomly selected neighbour is correct. If ωs = 0.5 neighbours are believed to have an even chance of being
correct, and thus provide no additional information, while if ωs = 1 neighbours will always be followed and the social
information is assumed to be infallible.
We stress that ωs does not represent the true probability an individual is correct but rather a belief about that
probability that can be translated into a decision rule. Further, while this analysis represents a formal interpretation of
the social confidence level, in terms of a probability, this parameter is free to evolve and may give too much, or too
little, weight to observed opinions. The only restriction placed on individuals is that the motivations of neighbours are
unknown, meaning a scenario where two neighbours share an opinion based on their independent personal information
is indistinguishable from a scenario where one neighbour has copied the other. Effectively this assumption restricts
the domain of our model to systems in which honest communication of personal information, or confidence levels,
does not occur.
Formally, individual i assumes
P
(
U j = 1
∣∣∣G ≥ 0) = ωs ∀ j ∈ Ni (11)
and
P
(
U j = −1
∣∣∣G < 0) = ωs ∀ j ∈ Ni. (12)
The estimated probability (assuming independence) of observing the vector of responses of neighbours, U j∈Ni , if the
global information G ≥ 0 is then
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G ≥ 0) = ∏
{ j
∣∣∣U j=1}ωs
∏
{ j
∣∣∣U j=−1} (1 − ωs) (13)
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while if G < 0 then this is
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G < 0) = ∏
{ j
∣∣∣U j=1} (1 − ωs)
∏
{ j
∣∣∣U j=−1}ωs. (14)
Combining these two equations leaves
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G ≥ 0, gi)
P
(
U j∈Ni
∣∣∣G < 0, gi) =
(
ωs
1 − ωs
)N+−N−
(15)
where N+ and N− are the number of neighbours for which U j = 1 and U j = −1, respectively. Finally, we may
substitute Eqns. 10 and 15 into Eqn. 5 to attain the optimal individual decision making strategy, given a social
confidence level ωs, as
Ui = sign
[
− 1 + . . .
∫ 1
0 e
−ωg(gi−z)2/σ2P(G = z)dz∫ 0
−1 e
−ωg(gi−z)2/σ2P(G = z)dz

(
ωs
1 − ωs
)N+−N− . (16)
2. Numerical simulations
We next simulate an individual-based model that incorporates the decision rule previously described. For these
simulations we first need to define the functional form of G(t) and prescribe an interaction network over which so-
cial observations are made. As a first approximation we use a mean-field model for the interaction network. This
assumes that the population is well-mixed and observations are drawn at random at each time step. The advantage of
this approach is that the social network is simplified to a single parameter k, that defines the size of the interaction
neighbourhood, such that k = |Ni| ∀i. However we note that our results are not dependent on this assumption and
simulations incorporating various structured interaction networks are shown in Supplementary Figs. S5-S7.
To model the environmental information we employ an alternating, periodic function for G(t). By using a deter-
ministic function, we are able to control both the nature of transitions between environmental states and the length of
the time interval between transitions. While this simplifies our analytical calculations, similar results are attained in
the case of more realistic, stochastic environments (see Supplementary Fig. S4 for details). For G(t) we use both a
periodic triangle wave and a square wave input. Mathematically these are defined as
G(t) =
2
pi
arcsin (sin(2pit/TE)) (17)
for the triangle wave, and
G(t) = 2 × Θ
(TE
2
− t mod TE
)
− 1 (18)
for the square wave, where Θ is the Heaviside step function, and TE determines the time scale of the environmental
variation in both cases. The shape of these functions may be viewed in the time series shown in Fig. 1 A and B (dashed
lines).
These two expressions for G(t) provide two optimal rules for Eqn. 16 by determining the form of P(G = z). If the
triangle wave is used then
P(G = z) =
0.5, z ∈ [−1, 1]0 otherwise (19)
whereas for the square wave,
P(G = z) =
1
2
[δ(z − 1) + δ(z + 1)] (20)
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where δ is the Dirac delta function. By substituting these functions into Eqn. 16, an optimal decision rule can be
obtained that is a function only of gi(t) (personal information) and U j∈Ni (social information). In Fig. 1 results from
simulations of the model are shown. The beneficial aspects of social information can be clearly observed as ωs
increases. However over-reliance on this information, represented by larger values of ωs, results in steep declines in
performance as the group becomes rapidly less responsive.
The results of the simulations, shown in Fig. 1, demonstrate the advantages, and disadvantages, of utilizing social
information. By following the behaviour of others, individuals increase their accuracy. This increase in accuracy goes
beyond the classic ‘wisdom of crowds’ concept, whereby the variance in the fraction of correct individuals observed
over independent trials converges to zero, an effect most clearly expounded by Condorcet’s jury theorem [31]. To
enable a comparison to this effect, accuracy is calculated as if independent estimates were aggregated and shown in
Fig. 1C. For these results neighbours convey their own personal estimate of the cue (gi(t)). Equivalently, this may be
considered as the scenario where a single individual makes k independent observations of the cue and then takes the
average of those observations.
In the full simulations (solid lines of Fig. 1), observations of neighbours do not equate to independent estimates, as
neighbours are also making use of social information. This can result in a far superior performance, as individuals are
effectively accessing a greater number of estimates via the information flow through the social network. However, as
the weighting given to social information increases, the benefit is rapidly lost due to high levels of correlation [36, 37].
The lack of independence in individual behaviour leads to a sharp decrease in performance, until the system becomes
locked into a single response and accuracy is 0.5 (equal to a random chance of being correct).
3. Evolved strategies and collective unresponsiveness
In order to determine where, in parameter space, we should expect to find natural collective systems, we introduce
an evolutionary component into our simulations by allowing the parameter ωs to evolve. A selection algorithm [38]
is used that ensures an individual’s expected number of offspring is proportional to the accuracy of its response to
the environment. Offspring inherit the characteristics of the parent individual (ωs) with a small Gaussian mutation.
As social interactions occur at random within the population, our simulations preclude the evolution of any altruistic
traits that may benefit neighbouring individuals while incurring a personal fitness cost. Hence our model is focused
purely on selection at the individual level.
In Fig. 2, results from the evolutionary simulations are shown. We clearly observe a substantial distinction between
the evolved weighting of social information and the value that gives optimal collective performance. We find natural
selection drives the trait beyond the optimal level and moves the collective system toward an unresponsive state. In
these simulations we employ homogeneous populations as the initial condition with ωs = 0.5 for all individuals (no
social information is used). Results are robust to these assumptions as shown in Supplementary Figs. S8 and S9.
In order to understand the mechanisms underlying the simulation results, we investigate the dynamics of our
model within an evolutionary invasion framework [39]. To do so, we must first make some simplifying assumptions
regarding model properties. Namely we assume that the population is large, the number of social observations each
individual makes is also large, and that the environmental cue is defined by the step function of Eqn. 18. Given these
restrictions we attain an equation that governs the dynamics of the population when the external cue is in the state
G(t) = 1 as,
dX
dt
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf
[√
ωg +
1
2√ωg (X − 0.5) k ln
(
ωs
1 − ωs
)]
− X (21)
where X is the fraction of individuals that are responding correctly to the environment and, for simplicity, we have
rescaled the personal information parameter, ωg, by a factor of σ2 to reduce the number of parameters. (For a detailed
derivation of this equation see SI Text.)
As the environment alternates between different states on a characteristic time scale, the expected accuracy may
be calculated from the performance over a single, representative, time interval. Further, if we expect there to be low
accuracy immediately following a transition, we may approximate this initial state as X = 0, i.e. there is zero accuracy
within the group at time t = 0. The time-averaged accuracy may then be written as
A =
1
TE
∫ TE
0
X(t)dt (22)
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where X(t) is defined as the solution to Eqn. 21 with initial condition X(0) = 0. In the limiting case of large popula-
tions, and many social observations of the population, a single individual with social weighting of ω′s has a probability
of being correct that is dependent on the fraction of individuals in the population that are correct, according to
PC(X, ω′s) =
1
2
(
1 + . . .
erf
[√
ωg +
1
2√ωg (X − 0.5) k ln
(
ω′s
1 − ω′s
)])
. (23)
The expected accuracy, A(ω′s, ωs), of this mutant strategy over time is then
A(ω′s, ωs) =
1
2
+ . . .
1
2TE
∫ TE
0
erf
[√
ωg +
1
2√ωg (X(t) − 0.5) k ln
(
ω′s
1 − ω′s
)]
dt (24)
The evolutionarily stable strategy is found by locating the value of the resident population ωs around which small
mutations will have a lower accuracy [40, 41],
∂A(ω′s, ωs)
∂ω′s
∣∣∣∣
ω′s=ωs
= 0 (25)
Solutions to Eqns. 22 and 25 may be found numerically and these are shown in Fig. 3 alongside the corresponding
full simulation. To verify that the singular strategy is both evolutionarily and convergence stable, second derivatives
are taken with respect to the mutant strategy (evolutionary stability) and the resident strategy (convergence stability).
These derivatives are numerically evaluated at the location of the singular strategy and it is found that the value of
ωs that satisfies Eqn. 25 is both evolutionarily stable (no branching occurs), and convergence stable. (See SI Text for
further details.)
While this analysis confirms the results of the individual-based simulations, it provides little insight into the
underlying mechanisms. To gain a more heuristic understanding of the evolutionary process, we coarse-grain the
full dynamics of Eqn. 21, and consider a two-stage process that describes the population response to a change in the
environment.
The first stage consists of the period of time immediately following an environmental transition, before the popu-
lation has responded. This corresponds to the situation when most individuals are incorrect as X(t) < 0.5 andG(t) = 1.
The length of this phase is the response time, TR, of the collective system and may be calculated as
TR =
∫ 0.5
0
X˙−1dX. (26)
The second stage consists of the rapid transition to the steady state solution of Eqn. 21 and lasts for a period of
time TE−TR, i.e. until the next environmental switch. We may then approximate the full ordinary differential equation
as a process in which the population switches from a low proportion of individuals in the correct state 0 < X(t) < 0.5,
which we denote XL and approximate as XL = 0.25, to the high accuracy state X∞ which is the steady state solution
of Eqn. 21. The switch occurs after time TR, and we use the full dynamics to calculate the length of this period.
As shown in Eqn. 23, an individual with social weighting ω′s has a probability of being correct that is dependent
on the accuracy of other individuals in the population. In this reduced framework the expected long term accuracy of
an individual with social weighting ω′s within a population of individuals with social weighting ωs is
A(ω′s, ωs) =
TR(ωs)
TE
PC(XL, ω′s) + . . .
TE − TR(ωs)
TE
PC(X∞(ωs), ω′s). (27)
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The usefulness of this expression lies in the division of the impact of individual and collective properties on accuracy.
The steady-state group accuracy, X∞, and the length of the response time are controlled by the resident population
parameter ωs, while the rare strategy ω′s governs the individual-level accuracy in each phase.
Again the evolutionarily stable strategy is found by solving the equation
∂A(ω′s, ωs)
∂ω′s
∣∣∣∣
ω′s=ωs
= 0. (28)
Introducing the notation,
P′C(X) =
∂PC(X, ω′s)
∂ω′s
∣∣∣∣
ω′s=ωs
(29)
it can be shown that the ESS is reached when
TR(ωs)
TE
=
P′C(X∞)
P′C(X∞) − P′C(XL)
. (30)
This expression may be interpreted as a balancing of the gain in accuracy attained by increasing sociality when X is
high, with the loss in accuracy when X is low, weighted according to the respective length of time of each phase. The
equation is written in this form so that the time spent prior to a collective response to the environment (LHS) may be
related to the ratio of accuracy changes at the individual level (RHS).
Next we follow a similar approach to find the optimal value of the resident population. To find this collectively
optimal accuracy it is necessary to solve
∂A(ωs, ωs)
∂ωs
= 0 (31)
i.e. find the value of ωs that maximizes accuracy considering its impact on both individual level decisions and the
aggregate properties of the system. Neglecting the effect of the resident population strategy on the value of X∞, and
only including the dominant effect on the lack of responsiveness, Eqn. 31 may be rearranged to give
TR(ωs)
TE
=
P′C(X∞)
P′C(X∞) − P′C(XL)
. . .
− 1
TE
dTR(ωs)
dωs
(
PC(X∞, ωs) − PC(XL, ωs)
P′C(X∞) − P′C(XL)
)
(32)
By comparing Eqns. 30 and 32 we observe the key difference between the optimal and evolved solutions; to achieve
the optimal level of information processing, the increase in the collective inertia of the system must be considered.
This increase in response time with respect to the social weighting manifests itself in the second term on the RHS of
Eqn. 32. As this term is absent from the ESS, the population will always evolve toward unresponsiveness, moving
beyond the optimal value of ωs and stabilizing only when the social information is sufficiently degraded.
To visualize the role of each term in Eqns. 30 and 32, their values have been plotted in Fig. 4. This geometric
view of the equations illustrates the influence of each term and how they combine to create a sub-optimal collective
response. It is worth noting that the rapid increase in the delay time as sociality increases leads to a precipitous drop
in responsiveness. This translates into high variation in accuracy across generations caused by fluctuations around the
ESS value of ωs. As accuracy declines so steeply in the vicinity of the ESS value, when mutations are high the system
frequently becomes completely unresponsive, as demonstrated by the repeated low accuracy states shown in Fig. 3A.
4. Discussion
Over-reliance on social information is a common and frequently observed behaviour in many species. In humans
this is manifested in many well-studied phenomena such as rapid technology adoption and lock-in [42], or the boom-
and-bust cycles of financial markets [11, 43]. Non-human animals may also devalue their personal information in
favour of copying others [44], resulting in sub-optimal collective behaviour even when individuals are aware of more
suitable alternatives [45].
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Several previous studies have investigated this effect in the context of human decision-making, notably [10,
46] (but also see [47–49], and [50] for a review). These models assume decision-making is sequential, previous
decisions are observed, and agents behave rationally given the information that is available. Under these assumptions
information cascades will occur as the number of individuals increases. Fundamentally, this effect arises because
individuals are unable to recognize the decisions of others that are based on copying.
A similar mechanism underlies the results of our model, however in our framework individuals are allowed to
employ any level of confidence in social information. As strategies evolve based on their performance, there is the
potential for individuals to avoid over-dependence on social information. Our results show that while high-levels of
accuracy are initially attained, natural selection continually drives the population beyond the optimal performance
levels, due to the conflict between individual and collective interest [51].
By employing optimal decision theory and evolutionary invasion analysis, we have shown that over-reliance on so-
cial information evolves in dynamic environments. Since individuals in a well-functioning group provide an excellent
source of information, natural selection leads to over-reliance on social cues, even to the point of unresponsiveness.
When mutations are large but infrequent, highly conformist individuals take over the population and lead to an almost
complete failure in information processing. Once this has occurred less social individuals are selected for, and higher
accuracy levels are re-established. However, in the limit of vanishing mutation rates, analytical conditions show that
information processing will evolve to be sub-optimal, as the disadvantages of over-confidence in social information
are felt at the collective level (groups become unable to escape from dominant, widely held opinions).
The sharp deterioration in accuracy observed as social weightings are increased is in agreement with other studies
of collective movement. For example, in a recent work Codling & Bode [52] showed that when groups use social
information accuracy is improved, and a surprisingly large amount of social weighting was observed to be optimal.
However, in agreement with the results presented here, steep declines in performance occurred as social influence
increased. In this context, our findings predict that the high-accuracy navigating groups of [52] will be unstable,
and animal groups in nature are more likely to be found with values of social weighting that place them close to the
collapse of accurate motion.
Investigating the ultimate drivers of social behaviour is not feasible in most species, however quorum-sensing
bacteria [53] present a promising avenue for future tests of our theory. Bacteria respond to both social and environ-
mental information, and may be evolved in a laboratory setting. For bacteria responding to a dynamic environment,
we predict that over-reliance on social information and an increased unresponsiveness will evolve over time.
The results we present illustrate that evolution may not lead to effective information processing groups, even in
the absence of any cost to acquiring personal information. This has implications in a variety of contexts. Notably our
findings challenge the notion that we should expect animal groups to be ‘tuned’ to respond optimally to environmental
information. Instead collective inertia should be considered the default, and we predict that social species will display
less behavioural plasticity and respond more slowly to changes in their environment. In the context of human interac-
tion, our results suggest that when social information is available individuals will over use it [54] and this should be
considered when attempting to engineer effective groups or organisations.
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Figure 1: Numerical simulations. (A) Time series of average response to the environment 〈U(t)〉 (solid lines) and G(t) (dashed line) for triangle
wave. Parameter values are k = 4, N = 200, ωg = 0.2, σ = 1,TE = 100. Values used for ωs are shown as triangles with corresponding color in
C. (B) as A for square wave and parameter values k = 8, N = 100, ωg = 0.1, σ = 1, TE = 500. (C) Accuracy as a function of social information
weighting for parameters as in A (triangle points, grey line) and B (square points, black line). Accuracy is defined as the time averaged fraction of
individuals for which U = sign (G(t)) The dashed lines illustrate the performance when k independent observations are made directly by individuals
(i.e. the performance according to the ‘wisdom of crowds’ hypothesis).
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Figure 2: Evolutionary simulations. (A) Evolution of accuracy for triangle wave (red) and square wave (blue). Parameter values are, triangle wave:
k = 8, N = 50, ωg = 0.2, σ = 1, TE = 1000; square wave: k = 4, N = 200, ωg = 0.1, σ = 1,TE = 500. Generations consist of simulations lasting
for 100 × TE time units. (B-C) Average response to a change in the environment as evolution proceeds. Colors match to the parameter values and
stage of evolution shown in A. Units are rescaled by TE , with t = 0 corresponding to the point at which G(t) switches from negative to positive. (D)
Performance and evolved state. Lines represent the performance for a homogeneous population while points show the actual ESS value to which
the system evolves.
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Figure 3: Evolutionary analysis. (A) Average accuracy of an individual-based simulation of evolution. The square wave is employed with parameter
values: k = 80, N = 500, ωg = 0.1, σ = 1, TE = 200. A Gaussian mutation rate of 1e−6 was used; this level of mutation leads to oscillations
between high-accuracy generations and total unresponsiveness. (B) Average accuracy of an individual-based simulation with a mutation rate of
1e−7. Evolution converges to a stable value (average over final 100 generations is shown in red). (C) Comparison of simulation and analytical
solutions. Gray line shows accuracy for an individual-based simulation with a fixed weighting of social information (ωs). Red line indicates
evolved accuracy from simulation. Black line shows the performance calculated from Eqn. 22, blue point represents the analytical ESS calculated
from Eqn. 25.
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Figure 4: Interpreting evolutionary stability and optimal performance. Grey line shows the accuracy as a function of ωs from the individual-based
simulations (k = 80, N = 500, ωg = 0.1, σ = 1, TE = 200), grey point shows the evolved average accuracy. Black line shows the accuracy
calculated from the reduced model of Eqn. 27. Solid red line shows the LHS of Eqn. 30
( TR(ωs)
TE
)
, solid blue line shows the RHS of Eqn. 30,
where they intersect corresponds to the ESS value of the social weighting. The red dashed line shows the value of 1TE
dTR(ωs)
dωs
(
PC (X∞ ,ωs)−PC (XL ,ωs)
P′C (X∞)−P′C (XL)
)
.
Subtracting this from the solid blue line as in Eqn. 32 and finding the intersection with TR(ωs)TE (solid red line) gives the optimal weighting of social
information.
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